In this paper, we model a specialist call market. Liquidity traders and a strategic informed trader submit market orders. Strategic value traders compete with the specialist through the limit order book. Noise is introduced into the book through the number of value traders. We compare an equilibrium in an open limit order book environment with an equilibrium in a closed limit order book environment. We nd that while liquidity traders and the informed trader are better o when the book is open, value traders are better o when the book is closed. We also show that on average, the opening price is more informative in the open book environment.
Introduction
The New York Stock Exchange NYSE uses a call-type trading procedure in the opening and after a trading halt to establish a price that re ects broad interest. The trading procedure that the exchange employs is as follows. At the opening" market buy and at the opening" market sell orders that have accumulated while the exchange has been closed are paired automatically by the Opening Automated Report Service OARS. The imbalance is presented to the specialist who then compares it with the limit orders that have accumulated in his electronic book. The specialist nds a price that will clear the market order imbalance as well as all the limit orders to buy sell at or below above the clearing price. However, unlike a t ypical auctioneer, the specialist can buy or sell for her own account.
It is often argued that the specialist has an important informational advantage because no one else sees the book. 1 If the book were open, the reasoning goes, other value traders could compete more e ectively with the specialist, reducing his monopoly rents. Furthermore, one would expect that an increase in competition for the provision of liquidity would bene t traders who demand immediacy and submit market orders. For example, D'Ambrosio 1990 states that 2 1 In some situations some level of disclosure is required. For example, in the case of a large order imbalance that results in an opening delay, the specialist solicits the crowd for contra side orders while he disseminates the message ORD.IMB to the tape see Hasbrouck, So anos and Sosebee 1993. Furthermore, with the specialist's consent, the oor brokers too can see the book. Thus, in practice they too enjoy information advantage over the o -exchange traders. 2 Wunsch1989 also advocates opening the book. He suggests that market makers would be wise to focus their future e orts on lling the auction house..., rather than defending a personal nancial interest in the auction prices.
Opening the specialist's book at the open of the market is the most important step that could now be taken in this Putting aside the matter of whether the specialist system should be eliminated, at the minimum should the specialist be forced to show his book at the opening? ... even under normal circumstances trading into the specialist's book is courting havoc. Doing so at the opening when value-, noise-, and liquidity-based traders also transact creates not uncertainty, but the almost certain result that the monopoly power of the specialist will prevail and trading costs to all others will be excessive.
The present paper is the rst, to my knowledge, to study this issue in a formal model. The model that is employed is a variant of the standard microstructure model. Liquidity-motivated market orders are taken as exogenous. A single strategic informed trader also submits a market order. A nite numberof strategic o -exchange value" traders submit limit orders. The specialist sets the price and clears the market, with the book taking precedence over the specialist. In contrast, we show that the value traders extract more rents when the book is closed, and nudirection." merical analyses indicate that the specialist too is better o in the closed book environment. These results can be explained in the following way. In the closed book environment, the specialists and the value traders enjoy informational advantages. The specialist observes the complete structure of limit order book, while the value traders have partial knowledge of the book's structure. Each of them knows that the book contains his order. These advantages do not exist in the open book environment. Furthermore, our results are robust with respect to the distribution of the noise that we i n troduce into the book.
Empirical studies of this issue have been made by Stoll and Whaley 1990 and Biais, Hillon and Spatt 1997. Stoll and Whaley 1990 study the opening on the NYSE. They nd that prices tend to reverse around the opening, and they conclude that the immediacy suppliers extract rents from the liquidity traders. On the other hand, Biais, Hillon and Spatt 1997 study the opening in the Paris Bourse, which i s a n o p e n b o o k e n vironment where a disinterested auctioneer, a computer, sets the clearing price. They suggest that the preopening inductive prices converge to an e cient opening price.
Another related paper is Madhavan and Panchapagesan 1997. They are interested in examining the information in the evolution of the limit order book in the NYSE, which i s a v ailable only to the specialist who can observe each order separately. They conclude that the specialist enjoys valuable information that helps him facilitate price discovery.
Our model does not incorporate the group of oor brokers. We explicitly assume that in the closed book environment only the specialist has access to the book. Interestingly, So anos and Werner 1997 nd that the participation of oor brokers at the opening is very low. They estimated the value of oor brokers' executed orders at the opening, excluding orders submitted through the OARS, to be only 0.9 percent.
While the current paper focuses on the limit order bookat the opening, Rock 1990 models the limit order book in a continuous trading environment with competitive value traders and a strategic specialist. Whereas the trading protocol at the opening is a uniform-price auction, the continuous trading protocol can be viewed as discriminatory price auction. That is, a large market order is paired-o with several limit orders, possibly at di erent prices. In Rock 1990 and Seppi 1997, the specialist's advantage is that he sees the market order size before he trades, while the competitive v alue traders have to form an expectation of the size of the market order. In the current paper, this informational advantage does not exist with an open book. This happens because in equilibrium there is a one to one relation between the clearing price and market order imbalance. 
The Model
We consider a call market for a risky asset and one risk free asset num eraire with interest rate set to zero. At time 1, the risky asset paysṽ. We will study an equilibrium in two di erent e n vironments.
In one environment, the limit order bookis open, while in the other only the specialist observes the book. The characteristics of both environments are presented below, followed by a discussion.
There are four types of participants in our market. The rst group consists of the liquidity traders. We do not model their behavior; however, it is to serve their trades that the market is open. We denote their aggregate market orders byz.
One strategic risk neutral informed trader who knows the realization ofṽ submits a market orderx. 3 The aggregate market orderỹ, which w e sometimes call the market order imbalance, is equal toz + x .
Demand schedules are submitted to the specialist byÑ strategic risk neutral traders, who are called value traders". For the distinction between open and closed books to be meaningful, there must be some uncertainty about the book. In this paper, noise is introduced into the book through the numberofvalue traders, who are assumed to be drawn out of a pool of potential value traders.
Furthermore, it is assumed that conditional on the realization ofÑ, each of the potential value traders is equally likely to be present in the market. We denote by f i the i th value trader's demand schedule with the interpretation that at the price p, f i p is the quantity that the trader demands. It is convenient to denote the book's randomness by writing fÑ ; = P N i =1 f i . We will study equilibria in which all the value traders make the same choice of a demand schedule. Due to the mathematical di culty o f solving the value traders' problem, we restrict the value traders to downward sloping linear demand schedules.
The role of the specialist is to set a single price and clear the market. As a dealer, the specialist can buy and sell for her own account. However, she is subject to one important restriction. At the 3 In our risk neutral environment, one can assume thatṽ is merely an unbiased estimator of the liquidation value.
clearing price, the rst transactions go to the book. It is this restriction that prevents the specialist from setting an arbitrarily high low price and selling buying all the excess market orders.
Given the price p chosen by the specialist, the informed trader's pro t is ṽ,px; 1 and the pro t of the i th value trader is ṽ,pf i p: 2
The specialist receives the quantity ,x ,z ,Ñ X The aggregate liquidity ordersz is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2 z . The numberofvalue traders,Ñ, is a bounded positive i n teger-valued random variable. A l o w er bound on the support ofÑ will be needed for certain results. We do not impose any other distributional assumptions onÑ. Given a random variableũ, the notations u and u are used to denote its realization and its expected value respectively.
In the rest of this section we elaborate on two of the restrictions that we h a v e imposed. A limit order is a single step function. It sets the upper lower price at which a trader is willing to buy sell up to a speci ed quantity. Since there is no restriction on the numberof limit orders that a trader can submit, a trader can approximate any demand schedule by submitting a sequence of limit orders see Kyle 1989 for further discussion of this issue. At times, maximizing in the space of functions is intractable. We use a standard approximation technique, namely maximizing over the set of linear functions. 4 It is common in the market microstructure literature to restrict the informed trader's strategy to the class of market orders only, on the ground that informed traders are impatient. 5 However,
we need not lose generality in the following sense. Every demand schedule can be divided into two parts. We can view the intercept as a market order term, and the part that depends on the clearing slope, does not contain any private information, even if we allow the informed trader to submit an arbitrary demand schedule. Though we do not report it here, this phenomenon also happens in our model. That is, if one allows the informed trader to submit a linear demand schedule, the slope of it does not depend on his private information. 6 3 Closed Book
In the closed bookenvironment, the informed trader can condition his market order only on the asset valueṽ. He has no information about the bookwhen he submits his order. We therefore write his market order as a function xv.
An important feature of a closed book environment i s t h a t a v alue trader knows his own demand schedule f i , and thus possesses some information on the book's contents. Here, this information is captured by the fact that a value trader knows that he is active in the market, i.e., the trader knows that the book contains his order. Let m i be the indicator function of the event that the i th trader is active, i.e., m i = 1 when he is active and m i = 0 otherwise.
The specialist observes both the market order y xṽ + z and the book fÑ ; before choosing the price p, so she will choose the price as a function ofỹ and fÑ ; . We write this function as Py;f. Given a demand schedule f 1 , the book is
The expected pro t of the value trader, contingent on the knowledge that he is active in the market, is E v , p f 1 p j m i = 1 wherep P y;f 1 + f , 1 N ; We use the subscript c to indicate the closed book environment.
Proof: Before we show that the system 7 de nes an equilibrium, we need to show that the system possesses a solution. If a solution exist then it implies that The proof that the system 7 de nes an equilibrium is given in Appendix A.
The assumption thatÑ 2 and nondegenerate is su cient for the existence of an equilibrium.
It is, however, not necessary. What is important is that a value trader will not assign too much weight to the event that he has monopoly power, i.e. the event fÑ = 1 g .
The equilibrium that we have found has several features that distinguish it from what has been done so far in the literature. Here, not only does a value trader infer information from the clearing price, and utilize this information by conditioning his demand on the opening price. He also takes into account the behavior of the strategic specialist that chooses her position only after all the orders have been submitted to her. Furthermore, because the number of traders in our model is uncertain, the price impact of a market order, measured by c , is random. Neither a value trader nor the informed trader observes c , although, as we h a v e mentioned before, a value trader possesses some information about it. It turns out, as the following lemma demonstrates, that there is a simple way to express the statistical value of that information which w e h a v e denoted by m i . Since the liquidity that a value trader provides is inversely related to his belief about the aggregate liquidity that is provided by the market, which is captured by c , one could argue that since the value traders over estimate the aggregate liquidity provision, opening the bookshould increase it. To make this statement precise we need rst to know how the specialist and the informed trader will revise their strategies in respond to opening the book. This is the aim of the next section.
Open Book
In this section we w ould like to remove the specialist's informational advantage by opening the book.
However, as with the closed book environment, the market order imbalance is the specialist's private information. Although the market order imbalance is unrevealed, a value trader can implicitly condition on the order imbalance, because the quantity he receives depends on the price and the price varies one-to-one with the market order in the equilibrium to be presented.
Modelling the dynamic of an open bookenvironment is a fairly complicated task. Firstly, we need to de ne the trading protocol. For example, we need to decide whether a trader can withdraw his order once it has been submitted, and whether or not there is a penalty for such an action? 9 Once we agree what the trading protocol is, we have to nd the equilibrium. However, even under a simple set of trading rules it seems a di cult task to nd an equilibrium. Instead, the approach taken in this paper is not to refer to a speci c trading protocol, but instead to assume that when the market is called the b o o k i s i n a state of equilibrium, i.e., given the book's status, no single trader desires to change his order. We continue, as in the closed bookenvironment, to maintain the role of the specialist as the follower", who takes her actions only after the book has reached equilibrium. This time, however, the specialist has no informational advantage since everyone sees the book before the market is called.
A book in a state of equilibrium is the one that will result from a static Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies under the assumption that N is common knowledge. In such an equilibrium, 9 In The Paris Bourse preopening orders can be canceled. Wunsch 1989 proposes that orders, once submitted, cannot be canceled or o set.
each one of the traders perfectly predicts the book's structure before submitting his order. In particular, once the book is realized no trader desires to change his order, and the specialist can call the market, i.e., announce the price and clear the market.
Therefore, we consider an equilibrium where the informed trader's market order is a function xv;N, a demand schedule is a function f 1 N; , and the price rule is PN;f;y. Proof: This is merely a special case of Theorem 3.1, in which the distribution that governsÑ is degenerate. Indeed, once we considerÑ as known, the system 7 reduces to 13.
Despite risk neutrality, the semi-strong-e cient condition,p = E ṽjp , does not hold in equilibrium because of the market power of the liquidity providers. In fact, the specialist's and the value traders' expected gains are strictly positive. However, we can prove the following. However, as N goes to in nity, q N N,2 goes to one, and prices become e cient.
Comparison of Equilibria
Due to the risk-neutrality assumption, the model that we have presented is a zero-sum game.
Hence, moving from one environment to the other cannot bene t everyone. In this section, we ii The informed trader's expected pro t is higher in an open book equilibrium than in a closed book equilibrium.
Proof: The liquidity traders' aggregate expected losses are E ṽ,p z . Using the independence ofṽ,zandÑ we h a v e in both equilibria:
and the rst part of the theorem follows from Lemma5.1.
In both equilibria, the informed trader's expected pro t is Eṽ,p ṽ, v = Eṽ, v,z+ ṽ, v ṽ, v = 1 2 where the last equality follows from the zero expectation ofz, the independence ofz;ṽandÑ and hence which is only a function ofÑ, and the relation E 2 = 1 2 E which holds in both equilibria see the fourth equation in 7 and the fourth one in 13.
We conclude that in order to compare the ex ante pro t, we should compare the expected value of the intensity of trade. Hence, the result follows from the second part of Lemma5.1.
Since on average, the cost of immediacy is higher and the informed trader's intensity of trade is smaller in the closed book environment than in the open book environment, the following result
should not come as a surprise. Under the assumption that z = v = 2, the specialist's expected pro t was calculated for di erent In the next section we will prove that given the above price rule, the book has the form v,pÑ B ,
i.e, a = 0 . This will imply that we can also express the clearing price as , and thus will prove the necessity of the rst and second equations in 13.
The value traders: Let f ,1 = v,pCÑ, and let the rst trader's demand schedule be v,pB+a, where B and a are arbitrary constants. First, we show that it not optimal to submit a 6 = 0 . F rom 18 it follows that the clearing price will bẽ
The constant a can be viewed as a market order, however, one that contains no information. From the specialist's optimal clearing price it follows that on average the specialist will be on the other W e conclude that a has to be zero.
In the following, we take a = 0 and solve for the optimal slope B. While the trader cannot observe the market order imbalance directly, he can infer some information about it from the clearing price. The inverse relation between the clearing price and the market order imbalance is given byỹ 2 The function h 2 N;Eã;rEã is increasing in the rst argument.
3 The function Na is convex. 4 The function h 2 a; r is decreasing with r. 5 The function ra is concave.
It follows that
Eh 2 Ñ ; a;r h 2 NEã; Ẽ a;rErh 2 EÑ ; Ẽ a;rã h 2 EÑ ; Ẽ a;Er:
The function h 3 is linear, and hence Eh 3 ã;r = h 3 Ẽ a; Er. This ends the proof.
